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Abstract--Two methods, a direct and an indirect one, are presented to solve the Nash bargaining problem. 
In the direct method the bargaining problem is dealt with in a Hilbert space setting as a constrained 
optimization problem. The feasible direction method isapplied to find its solution. The indirect method 
consists of solving the Nash bargaining problem as a hierarchical decision problem, where at the top level 
of the hierarchy an algebraic equation issolved to obtain the bargaining solution. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Bargaining problems emerge in situations where two or more decision makers (DMs) act 
cooperatively taking into account he interests of all the DMs. The Nash bargaining scheme is 
based on four axioms of rationality and it provides a way by which a cooperative policy for the 
DMs can be found. The Nash bargaining solution for an N-player decision problem can be defined 
as follows (for an axiomatic derivation of Nash's bargaining scheme in finite games--for example 
[1]): let f~ be the decision set for DMi, 1 ~< i ~<N, set t~ = f~l x . . .  x fiN, and let Jt, J~: f l--,R, be 
the objective functional for DMi. Then we say that u*e  f~ is a Nash bargaining solution if it is 
a solution to the problem 
N 
max ]-'I (Ji(u) - D1 ) 
i=l 
subject o u ~ f~, J~(u) >t D~, for all i, where D~ e R is a status quo outcome for DMi. (DI . . . . .  D~) 
can be identified, for example, as a noncooperative Nash outcome, provided such exists. 
In our previous paper [2] the bargaining problem was formulated as an optimal control problem. 
It was shown that bargaining solutions can be found by iteratively solving an algebraic equation, 
in which a two-point boundary value problem is solved in each iteration step. In this paper we 
shall propose two approaches to solve bargaining problems. First, the bargaining problem is 
considered a constrained optimization problem in a Hilbert space and the feasible direction 
method by Pironneau and Polak [3] is applied to find its solution. Secondly, a hierarchical method 
of finding bargaining solutions in considered. In fact, we shall give the conditions under which 
the Nash bargaining problem is equivalent o a two-level hierarchical decision problem. This 
makes the computation of the bargaining solution attractive, since the original problem with the 
product-form of objectives is now imbedded into a family of problems which are linear in the 
DMs' objectives. At the lower level of the hierarchy a weighted sum of the DMs' objectives is 
maximized. At the top level a set of nonlinear algebraic equations i solved to obtain the bargaining 
solution. 
2. A DIRECT METHOD IN A H ILBERT SPACE 
Let H be a Hilbert space and Jt: H ~ R, 1 ~< i ~< N, continuously Fr6chet 
funetionals on H. Let D ~ R :¢, and set 
r , (u)  = Ji(u) - D,, 
N 
F(u) = 1-I F,(u), 
i u l  
189 
differentiable 
l<~i<~N, (1) 
u e H.  (2) 
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Consider the following problem, called BP: 
max F(u) 
u~H 
subject o Fi(u)>tO, l~ i<~N.  
Necessary conditions for u* to solve BP are given by the Kuhn-Tucker theorem: 
(3) 
(4) 
Theorem 2.1 
Let u* solve BP, and let u* be a regular point of the constraints (4). Then there is :t ~ R N such 
that 
N 
Y" (~, + ~,)VF,(u*) = 0, (5) 
i=l  
N 
~, = I-I e:(u*), (6) 
j~ l  
j~ i  
).,F,(u*)=0, 2,>~0, F,(u*)>~O, l<~i<~N. (7) 
In [4] some computational methods for constrained optimization problems in Hilbert spaces were 
presented. In the following we apply the feasible direction method by Pironneau and Polak [3] to 
find u* satisfying the optimality conditions (5)-(7) for problem BP. 
Define the constraint set Z, 
Z -- {u ~ H IF,(u) >/0, Vi}. (8) 
Let uk e Z, set 
~:, = I-I F, fuk), 
and consider (the direction-finding) problem 
min {~ +½<s,s>} 
seH,~¢R 
(9) 
N 
subject to - ~/~<VF~(uk), s> ~< ~, -F~(u k) - <VFi(uk), s> ~< ?i~, I ~< i ~< N, (I0) 
i=l 
where ?~, I ~< i ~< N, are nonnegative real numbers. 
Now, suppose all the trial points uk¢ Z are regular points of the constraints (4). Let 
(s k, ~k) ~ H x R be the solution to (I0). Then we have (i) if ~k < 0, then s k is a usable feasible 
direction at u ~, and (ii) if ~k>~ 0, then u k satisfies (5)-(7). 
The algorithm to find u* is given as follows. 
Algorithm 2.1 
Step 1. Set k = 0 and choose u ° ¢ Z. 
Step 2. Solve (10); let the solution be (s k, ~k). 
Step 3. If ~k I> _ E, then u* = u k. Else go to Step 4. 
Step 4. By a line search to the direction sk find the next trial point u k +t ¢ Z, set k ,= k + 1, and 
go to Step 2. 
Equation (10) is a LQ programming problem in a Hilbert space H x R. It can be transformed 
into a LQ programming problem in R N x R. Set 
g~fF,(u~), c~=VF,(uk), l <~i<~N. (11) 
It is obvious, from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, that the solution of (10) is of the form 
N 
s = ~ x~c~, x ,¢R,  l <<.i <~N. (12) 
i - I  
Computation fthe Nash bargaining solution 
Define a positive (semi-) definite symmetric matrix F k as 
Fk=(c .  cj), I<~i,j<~N. 
Then, instead of (10), consider 
min {¢ +½x'r*x} 
x~RN,~eR 
subject to  --I.tk'Fkx <~ ~, _gk __ Fx <~ ~?. 
Let (x k, ~*) ~ R N x R solve (14), and set 
N 
s*= E x c, 
i f f i l  
Then it is straightforward to show that (s*, ~*) solves (10). 
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(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
Remark 2.1 
Suppose there is a point u°6 H such that F~(u °) = 0 for all i (u ° can be, for example, a 
disagreement policy). Then it may be convenient to take u ° as a starting point in Algorithm 2.1, 
provided u ° is a regular point of the constraints (4). 
Remark 2.2 
Suppose there is a point u°~H such that F~(u °) > 0 for all i. Then one can solve BP without 
the constraints (4), for example by using the conjugate gradient method with u ° as a starting point. 
Since 
F(uk + 1) > F(u k) > . . .  > F(u o) > O, (16) 
it follows that during the iteration the constraints (4) are not active, i.e. for each k, 
E(u*) > 0, 1 ~<i ~<N. 
3. AN INDIRECT METHOD IN A HILBERT SPACE 
Let there be at least one point u ~ H such that Fi(u) > 0 for all i, and let u* ~ H solve BP. Then 
u* satisfies 
N 
g,VF~(u*) = 0, (17) 
i f f i l  
#,ffig-]Fj(u*), g~>O, l<~i<~N. 
Solutions to (17) and (18) can be sought by using the following indirect 
q 
#EA> f{2ERN[ , ; . i>O , Vi}, 
let co (#) be a solution to the equation 
N 
E ~,VF~(u) = 0. 
i - - I  
Set 
T~(#) = I-I Fj(co (#)), 1 ~< i ~ N. 
T(g)  ffi [T, (/z) . . . . .  Tic (#)]'. 
(18) 
method. For 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
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Then T: A > ---~R N. If u*¢A > solves the eqution 
T(/~*) - / t *  = 0, (23) 
then the corresponding u * = o2 (/~ *) solves (17) and (18). Thus the algorithm to find u * is as follows. 
Algorithm 3. I 
Step 1. Set k = 0 and choose a starting vector/~°e A >. 
Step 2. For t~keA > compute w(/z k) and T(#k). 
Step 3. If IIT(l~k)--l~kl[ <e, set /z* =/z k. Else, choose the next trial point Irk+leA >, set 
k--= k + 1, and go to Step 2. 
Consider the case where there are dynamic systems involved. Then (17) and (18) are the 
maximum principle necessary conditions for u* to solve BP without constraints (4). Thus (17) and 
(18) lead to a 2(n + N)-dimensional two-point boundary value problem (TPBVP), where n is the 
dimension of the system state. Although efficient numerical methods have been developed to solve 
such problems, it is convenient to do this, especially if N is large, by using Algorithm 3. I. According 
to Algorithm 3.1, u* can be found by iteratively solving an algebraic equation in R ~, in which a 
2n-dimensional TPBVP is solved in each iteration step. 
4. A GENERAL INDIRECT METHOD 
In this section we show that Algorithm 3.1 can also be used, with a slight modification, in more 
general problems with control constraints. 
Let now H = U be a vector space, and let t) c U. Let D e R N, and define Fi, F as in (1) 
and (2). Consider problem BP', 
max F(u) (24) 
u~t') 
subject o F~(u) >t 0, I ~< i ~< N. 
The following Lemma was proved in [2]: 
(25) 
Lemma 4.1 
Let u*e f~ be such that 
where 
Then u* solves (24) and (25). 
N N 
l~,F~(u) <~ ~., #,F~(u*) Vu ~f~, (26) 
i=1 i~1 
#~=I-IFj(u*), /.t,>0, l<~i<~N. (27) 
Remark 4.1 
Note that /z~>0 Vi implies F~(u*)>0 Vi. Namely, from (26) and (27) it follows that 
Fk(u*)>0 from some k (provided there is u e f t  such that F~(u)>~O Vi). Since 
Fj(u*)lz~= F(u*) = Fk(u*)ttk > O Vi, it follows that F~(u*) > 0 Vi. 
The converse of Lemma 4.1 is also true provided certain convexity assumption holds. Define 
S = {(Ft (u) . . . .  , FN(u))lu eta} c R N, (28) 
let A" = R N be the convex cone A" ffi {2 e R N I ;t~ ~< 0, Vi}, and set Y = S + A '~. It is easy to show 
that if Y is a convex set, and if BP' has a solution u* ¢ ~, then the corresponding optimal outcome 
(Ft(u*) . . . . .  F~(u*)) is unique. Then we have 
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Lemma 4.2 
Let Y be a convex set, and let u*~ fl solve BP' with Ft(u*)> 0 ¥i. Then (26) holds, where #,. 
is as in (27). 
Proof. Denote zi = F~(u*), 1 ~< i ~< N, l-lz~ = fl > 0. Since the optimal outcome is unique, it follows 
that for y ~ Y such that yi i> 0, and y # z, Hy~ < l-[z~. Set F = {x ~ RS]x~ >1 O, ¥i, IIx~ >>, fl}. Then 
Y c~F = {z), and the hyperplane L = {x IZ#t(x~- zt) = 0} is the unique tangent o F through z. 
Now, L separates Y and F since they are convex sets, and int Y c~ int F = 4. This implies that 
Y c {x lY~g~x~ ~< ~Zg~z~}, and since S c Y, (26) follows. 
Remark 4.2 
It follows from Theorem 4.1 in [5] that if fl is a convex set, and F~: t) ~ R, 1 ~< i ~< N, concave 
functionals on t~, then Y is convex. 
According to Lemma 4.1 solutions to BP' can be sought by using Algorithm 3.1, provided 
~o(# k) e fl is defined as a solution to the problem 
N 
max E #~Fi(u). (29) 
u~f l  i=  I 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper methods to compute the Nash bargaining solution for multiagent decision problems 
have been presented. The Nash bargaining problem is a product-form optimization problem with 
functional inequality constraints. One way to solve such problems in Hilbert spaces is the feasible 
direction method or, if the inequality constraints are neglected, the conjugate gradient method. 
However, in many applications ( ee for example, [2] and [6]), it is convenient to solve the bargaining 
problem as a hierarchical decision problem by using Algorithm 3.1. In Algorithm 3.1 the iteration 
proceeds on the Pareto boundary whereas in Algorithm 2.1 any feasible point can be used during 
the iteration. 
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